Ayo Phillips Bought a Houston Refinishing Shop in 2017 and Survived a Perfect Storm

The Setup Ayo Phillips closed on a resurfacing and refinishing business in Houston in 2017. The category covers bathtubs, countertops, tile, and related surface work. It is a cash-heavy, labor-intensive trade with low barriers to entry, which is exactly why it turns cutthroat fast. Technicians learn the craft, then leave to run their own trucks. Pricing collapses. Quality becomes a race to the bottom. Phillips did not fully price this dynamic in before closing. He bought with outside investors, which added an accountability layer most self-funded searchers do not carry. The target looked like a standard main-street deal: established customer base, a handful of crews, recurring commercial work alongside residential. On paper it was a reasonable entry vehicle. In practice the first ninety days broke almost every assumption underneath the model. The Deal Structure specifics were not disclosed on the podcast, but the profile matches the small self-funded playbook: modest enterprise value, SBA-adjacent financing, investor equity alongside operator skin in the game, seller handoff expected to be short. Houston metro, single location, blue-collar trade. First 100 Days Everything that could go wrong did. - Phillips's wife had a traumatic childbirth in Chicago. He was pulled out of the business during the window where a new owner most needs to be on site running point. - The first payroll run bounced. Nothing destroys trust with a crew faster than checks that do not clear. Several key technicians left inside weeks, some to start competing shops using the customer relationships they already held. - Hurricane Harvey hit Houston. The regional economy froze, job sites were underwater, and residential demand for cosmetic refinishing evaporated while homeowners dealt with actual structural damage. - He discovered the industry itself ran on kickbacks, quote rigging, and informal arrangements that the diligence process never surfaced. Revenue dropped sharply. The seller's goodwill was tied to relationships that walked out the door. Phillips had to choose between triaging the bleed and preserving cash for an eventual pivot. Operating Moves The rebuild took years, not quarters. Phillips stopped trying to defend the original business as bought and began rotating it toward the segments that actually paid. - He leaned away from residential one-off jobs, where acquisition cost was high and competitors underbid constantly, toward commercial and property-management accounts where margin and repeat volume were defensible. - He tightened labor. The defection wave forced him to rebuild a crew from scratch, this time with compensation and accountability structures that made leaving less attractive than staying. - He treated the business as a portfolio of service lines rather than one offering, cutting the lines that did not earn their keep. - He stayed in the seat through the storm. Investors were kept informed, not managed out. Partner capital survived because the operator did not quit.