Alan Lochridge Bought a 20-Year-Old Hardscaper and Grew It From $5.5M to $6.5M
A consultant swapped advisory work for a Charlotte hardscaping business with negative cash conversion and sub-based delivery.
The Setup Alan Lochridge was mid-career in consulting when a friend floated an idea that reframed his next decade: stop advising other people's businesses and go buy one. He wanted cash flow, operator leverage, and a business old enough to have survived a full cycle. He landed on The Stone Man, a 20-year-old hardscaping contractor in Charlotte, North Carolina. The business built patios, outdoor fireplaces, pool decks, and pergolas for residential customers across a metro with strong housing stock and a long outdoor season. On paper, hardscaping looks like the kind of project-based trade that scares searchers. No MRR. No service contracts. Revenue starts at zero every January. Alan's thesis was that project economics can mimic recurring-revenue economics when the cash mechanics and cost structure are right. The Deal Purchase price and financing were not disclosed publicly. What Alan bought was a business doing roughly $5.5M in revenue on an average job size around $70,000. That job size matters. At $70K, each sale is a considered purchase with a real sales cycle and a real deposit, which pulls the economics toward something closer to a custom-builder than a break-fix home-services operator. Two financial traits did the heavy lifting in diligence: - Negative cash conversion cycle. Customers paid deposits and progress payments before materials and subs were fully paid out. The business financed growth off customer cash, not a line of credit. - Low DSO. Collections were fast because the pricing model and contract terms front-loaded cash. The other structural advantage was a subcontractor-based delivery model. Crews were not on W-2 payroll. Fixed labor cost in a slow month stayed low, which protects the 18% margin line when demand softens. Operating Moves Alan's first operating job was doing nothing dramatic. A 20-year-old contractor with a known brand in a specific metro carries most of its value in reputation, Google reviews, and referral flow. Breaking that on day one is the fastest way to destroy a residential trades acquisition. Instead he focused on the levers the prior owner had under-pulled: - Keeping the sub bench happy and paid on time, which is how a hardscaper keeps calendar slots in peak season. - Protecting the premium position. $70K is not the low bidder's number. Holding pricing through inflation matters more than booking every lead. - Feeding the top of the funnel. Hardscape is a referral and visual business. Finished project photos, neighborhood density, and a fast estimate turnaround do more than paid acquisition for this category. Revenue moved from $5.5M to $6.5M under his ownership, roughly 18% top-line growth, while holding 18% profit margins. Operating Lessons - Project revenue is not automatically worse than recurring revenue. Evaluate the cash cycle, not the label. A deposit-funded project model can beat a net-30 SaaS contract on working capital. - A subcontractor model is a margin shock absorber. In seasonal trades, variable COGS on labor is worth more than the theoretical control of in-house crews. - Average ticket size is a diligence signal. $70K jobs filter...
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